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Abstract 
The objective of this empirical research is to assess the information dealing with intellectual capital that 
firms disclose in their prospectus and the potential influence on their intellectual capital disclosure in the 
annual report following to the initial public offering. The prospectus of companies that applied for initial 
listing on Euronext Brussels and Amsterdam between 2005 and 2009 were analyzed, including the first 
annual report after IPO, by means of a content analysis based on the disclosure index of Bukh et al 
(2005). First, the prospectus and annual report were compared based on their intellectual capital 
disclosure. Second, the prospectus and the annual report were studied in order to understand the 
disclosure practices on IC during a 5 year time period taken the recent financial crisis into account. Third, 
a model was built in order to explain the impact from IC disclosure in the prospectus on the disclosure in 
the annual report. Next to the result on the IC index for the prospectus (1), different control variables such 
as (2) industry, (3) company age, (4) size, (5) auditor and (6) ownership retention were added to the 
model.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, it has been commonly observed that a company‟s market value is well above its book 
value. This might suggest that traditional accounting systems deliver a financial statement that does not 
fully reflect the value relevant information. Previous research has revealed that intellectual capital (IC) or 
intangible assets (an intellectual capital component) outside the financial statements are the value drivers 
of firms since they increasingly base their own value on know-how, patents, skilled employees and other 
intangible assets (Bukh, 2003). The importance of these assets gained the attention of the International 
Accounting Standards Board. Therefore, they developed an accounting standard on intangible assets 
(standard IAS 38) which was update in 2008. According to this standard, some IC elements are disclosed 
in the annual report but most of them still remain undisclosed. Consequently, investors lack information 
which could result in an increased risk perception. This can cause difficulties in attracting funds and can 
possibly lead to an underestimation of future earnings (Walker, 2006). In order to avoid this 
underestimation, companies can decide to voluntarily disclose value relevant information. On the one 
hand, Cordazzo (2007) found that in the prospectus, companies provide investors with the voluntary 
disclosure of IC by reporting additional information on the companies‟ risk, future profitability and strategy. 
Brüggen et al. (2009), on the other hand, studied the determinants of IC disclosure in the annual report 
and identified industry and firm size as possible explanatory variables. Since the annual report generally 
focuses on the historical performance of the company, some differences are likely to be reflected in the 
nature of IC disclosure between the prospectus and the annual report. It is argued that the quality of 
reporting in the prospectus could be seen as a role model for future information disclosure of the 
company (Cumby and Conrad, 2001; Beattie, 1999). However, the question could be asked if companies 
that have a high level of IC disclosure in their prospectus also disclose relatively more in their annual 
report. In other words, does IC disclosure commitment exist? According to our knowledge, there is no 
literature on comparing IC disclosure in the prospectus and the annual report.  Only a slightly comparable 
study of Nielsen et al. (2006) indicated similarities between the IC disclosure in the intellectual capital 
statement and in the annual report. 
Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) found that Tai financial reporting disclosure practices increased over time, 
but the changes in disclosure occurred mainly in the economic crisis period, suggesting that the economic 
disturbance had an impact on it. Since the financial and economical crisis in 2008 caused a downfall of 
share prices on all global bourses, it is expected that companies disclose more voluntary information. The 
capital market-association theory assumes that earnings management and information disclosure have 
an impact on capital markets and therefore could be linked to an economic disturbance. The crisis could 
result in more accurate and relevant disclosure concerning intellectual capital in order to convince 
investors to buy shares from newly listed companies. Based on this outcome, we can investigate whether 
the recent financial crisis also had an influence on the level of voluntary IC disclosure in the prospectus 
and the annual report.  
2. Hypothesis development 
Previous studies on IC disclosure in the prospectus used a content analysis to determine whether 
stakeholder groups, with an interest in controlling certain strategic aspects of the organization, will be 
informed voluntarily on the company‟s IC during the initial public offering (IPO) (Bukh et al., 2004 ; Singh 
and Van der Zahn, 2008). During an IPO the amount of stakeholders of a company increases. The 
stakeholder theory suggests that an organization‟s management is expected to undertake activities 
deemed important by their stakeholders. According to the latter, a company will voluntarily disclose 
information about its intellectual performance above mandatory requirements in order to meet these 
expectations (Deegan, 2000). Moreover, the traditional accounting models are unable to reflect the new 
ways of creating value. The most intuitive measurement of the value of IC is the difference between the 
net book value and the market value of a company (Holland, 2001). Firms with a great difference between 
these two measures have a high level of IC. For some companies this difference may come from a brand 
name for others it may come from know-how or patents. The value of those intangible assets could 
represent more than 60 % of the business assets (Lev, 2001) and therefore the necessity to voluntarily 
report about these value creation indicators increases. Since reporting on IC is voluntary, firms will only 
disclose this information if there are advantages related to. These advantages are, according to 
Vergauwen and van Alem (2005) and Depoers (2000), among others related to decreasing information 
asymmetry between the company and the users of financial statements, lower borrowing costs due to a 
better estimation of the risk associated with the company and a higher value relevance of the financial 
statements. Furthermore, economic theory suggests that a commitment by a firm to an increased level of 
disclosure should lower the information asymmetry component of the firm‟s cost of capital. Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) showed that substantially increased levels of disclosure caused several economic 
benefits. Based on a sample of German companies, they found that an international reporting strategy 
(which assumes a commitment towards an increased level of disclosure) is associated with lower bid-ask 
spreads and higher share turnover. Due the nature of the economic benefits accompanied with it, firms 
that have undertaken an IPO will continue to disclose more. Therefore, it could be assumed that IC 
disclosure commitment starts in the prospectus and will be reflected in the subsequent annual report. This 
results in the following hypothesis 
H1: A more than average level of IC disclosure in the prospectus results in a more than average level of 
IC disclosure in the subsequent annual report due to disclosure commitment. 
Previous research on financial reporting (Cooke and Wallace, 1990) revealed that the environment in 
which the company operates shapes financial reporting practices. According to this legitimacy theory, 
organizations continually try to operate within the boundaries and norms of their societies. From this 
perspective, a company would voluntarily report on activities if the management perceived that this was 
expected by society. These expectations are not fixed but change over time. Consequently, the company 
needs to be responsive to the environment in which it operates (Deegan, 2000). It is expected that firms 
are more likely to report on their IC if they find themselves unable to legitimize their status on the basis of 
the traditionally recognized fixed assets as symbols of corporate success. Since the recent economic 
disturbance changed the environment in which companies operate, the following hypotheses can be 
formulated: 
H2a: The economic disturbance has a positive influence on the voluntary reporting of IC in the IPO 
prospectus. 
H2b: The economic disturbance has a positive influence on the voluntary reporting of IC in the annual 
report. 
 
Daily et al. (2003) suggested that the IPO prospectus is often more precise than other reporting media 
because companies are liable for any misleading or inaccurate information. It can be observed that the 
prospectus usually contains more information about future expectations regarding market developments 
and earnings, strategic direction, management, board composition, etc., compared to the annual report. 
At the time of admission for listing on the stock exchange the company has to convince future 
shareholders to invest capital. Mather et al. (2000) found that the firms‟ management has an incentive to 
present the company in the best possible light in order to maximize the proceeds of the share issue. 
Although this could lead to earnings management, the IPO prospectus provides insights into which types 
of information are selected by a company for representing itself in relation to investors and analysts. In 
other words, it could be argued that a company sees the prospectus as a publicity brochure in which it 
reports in detail about its achievements, skills and growth potential. All of these items are related to the 
intellectual capital of the company. Compared to the IPO prospectus, the annual report has not only 
investors as its readers but it also conveys information to employees, potential employees, customers, 
NGOs and other stakeholders. Due to this enlarged group of readers, it is argued that some differences 
occur in the extent of disclosure in both company documents. As to the annual report, the prospectus can 
be assumed to provide additional disclosure on the company‟s long term strategy and risks (Cumby and 
Conrad, 2001). This results in the following hypothesis: 
H3: Companies disclose in general more IC information in the prospectus than in the annual report. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data collection  
Prior literature tends to define IC as non-monetary assets without physical substance, such as innovation, 
knowledge, research and development, employee training or customer satisfaction, that have an impact 
on the firm‟s value (Lev and Zambon, 2003). Based on this definition, IC can be divided into structural 
capital, organizational capital and relational capital. These subdivisions are also found in the disclosure 
index of Bukh et al. (2004).  Based on the index of Bukh et al. (2004), 74 companies in Belgium and The 
Netherlands between 2005 and 2009 were coded. The index consists of 86 elements categorized into six 
subgroups namely „Employees‟, „Customers‟, „Information Technology‟, „Research and Development‟, 
„Processes‟ and „Strategy‟. For the subgroup „Strategy‟, three items were added namely „Competitor 
Names‟, „Suppliers‟ and „Business Acquisitions‟.  Furthermore, the subgroup „Customers‟ is extended with 
the items „Client Name‟, „Customer Satisfaction‟ and „Customer Knowledge‟. Lastly, the items „Insurance‟, 
„Key Employees‟, „Value Added on Employees‟, „Employee Attitude‟, „Employee Communicative Activities‟ 
and „Expert Teams‟ were added to the subgroup „Employees‟. These adaptations were based on the 
differences in indexes used in Bontis (2002), Vergauwen and van Alem (2005) and Beattie and Thomson 
(2007). Not only the presence or absence of information pertaining to each IC item for a particular 
company was documented, but also the difference between qualitative and quantitative information was 
taken into account. On the one hand, Bozzolan et al. (2003) introduced a weighting scheme for their IC 
disclosure index by counting qualitative disclosures as 1 and quantitative disclosures as 2. The reason 
lies in the fact that companies are more likely to be accurate in quantitative disclosure. Guthrie and Petty 
(2000), on the other hand, highlighted the difficulty in quantifying IC since it is in many instances a 
qualitative item. For this research the presence of a certain item is coded as 1 if the item is discussed in 
general, qualitative information specifically described on the selected item is coded as 2 and quantitative 
information as 3. The total score on the IC index is calculated as follows: 
SCORE  = ∑ di 
where di expresses itemi with value 1 if the itemi contains general information, 2 if the item i contains 
qualitative information and 3 if itemi contains quantitative information. This index is used to apply a 
content analysis. The method of a content analysis is a widely used method to quantify the amount of 
disclosure in company reports (Beattie and Thomson, 2007) 
A second researcher independently confirmed the coding of the first researcher in order to maintain 
consistency in the coding decisions. The prospectus as well as the annual report was analyzed manually 
for IC information. The annual report regularly contains both mandatory and voluntary information such as 
the financial statement (balance sheet, income statement, cashflow statement, notes and auditor‟s 
report), mission statement, chairman‟s report and corporate governance. Since there exists no accounting 
regulation on IC, corporate managers might choose to include IC items that are not reported in the 
financial statements but in other sections of the annual report in order to stress the importance to the 
reader. Therefore, every single company report is individually scanned for the list of IC-related terms of 
the index. Since not all corporate documents were available, the total sample resulted in 65 company 
prospectuses and 41 annual reports and financial statements. Due to their specific reporting 
requirements, we decided not to include the banking industry. 
3.2 Control variables 
To formally test whether there exists a disclosure commitment, a number of control variables were 
included into the analysis. Vergauwen & Van Alem (2005) found that companies in The Netherlands 
disclose relatively low on IC in comparison with French and German companies. Another research 
(Vandemaele et al., 2005) revealed that Swedish companies disclose on average more about IC than 
companies in The Netherlands and the UK. Based on a previous research (Orens & Derboven, 2008) of 
IC disclosure in the prospectus of Belgian companies, which indicated that they do not disclose an 
elaborated level of IC disclosure, we assume that there are no significant differences between these two 
countries.  
Previous research has often seen company age as a proxy for risk since more established companies are 
less risky. From this perspective, a company‟s amount of disclosure is expected to be related to the 
company age. Amir and Lev (1996) found that non-financial information is of greater importance for the 
valuation of younger companies. Furthermore, Jaggi (1996) found that the amount of inaccurate 
information in the prospectus is larger for younger companies. These previous studies might be an 
indication for a negative relationship between the level of disclosure on IC and company age. Company 
age is measured as the amount of years the company exists since its foundation.  Next to company age, 
researchers also found a relationship between the level disclosure and company size. Watson et al. 
(2002) indicate that the cost of voluntary reporting is relatively high for smaller companies compared to 
the cost for larger ones. Furthermore, larger companies have more to win with an increased level of 
information since the trading of effects increases due to lower uncertainty. These firms are under the 
control of the government and an increased level of disclosure can reduce the governmental pressure 
(Buzby, 1975). Moreover, the need for capital for large companies is higher than for small firms.  A lower 
cost of capital is obtained since the information asymmetry reduces. Based on a directive of Europe 
(2003/361/EG of the Commission of 6 may 2003) turnover, total assets and amount of employees can be 
used to determine the size of a company. All of these indicators for size were obtained for each company.  
Previous research tried to find a link between the amount of disclosure on IC and the industry to which 
the company is affiliated. Due to historical reasons some industries disclose more information than 
others. It is expected that if one company in a certain industry reports voluntarily on a specific topic, other 
players in the market will also report on that topic. Cooke (1991) found in his study that Japanese 
production companies disclosed significantly more in their reports compared to other industries. Also 
Wallace et al. (1994) and Dye & Sridhar (1995) suggest that the industry in which a company is active will 
have an influence on the voluntary disclosure behavior. A company that chooses not to disclose on a 
topic, is seen as a company that wants to hide bad news. The public attention that companies receive will 
influence the amount of disclosure. Different research has been performed in order to find evidence for 
this hypothesis. Cooke (1989) used a detailed index for the variable industry that exists out of production, 
commercial, services and conglomerates in his investigation for Swedish companies. The results 
indicated that commercial companies report less voluntary information compared to others. The research 
of Abdolmohammadi (2005) shows that certain industries of the new economy disclose more on 
intellectual capital and information systems compared to mature industries which disclose more on their 
brands and strategic alliances. The importance of intellectual capital disclosure is found in high-tech 
industries. Comparing the book value and the market to book ratio of these companies, it could be 
noticed that the values for IT and biotech companies are generally higher. Bukh et al. (2005) indicate that 
these companies will report more voluntary information next to the traditional financial reporting. In our 
study, the construct industry is measured by different dummy variables such as “Chemicals”, “Consumer 
goods”, “Industrial goods and utilities”, “Financial services” and “IT”. These categories are based on the 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) used by Euronext. Allocation to the appropriate industries in ICB 
classification system is made in collaboration with the management of the companies. Some industry 
classes of the ICB system were grouped together to increase the amount of observations for each 
industry group.  
Another variable of interest is audit firm. An audit firm uses its reputation as a competitive advantage. 
This reputation capital is strongly influenced by accounting scandals. The Enron debacle, for example, 
showed what can happen to an audit firm involved in such a scandal. Andersen, the audit firm of Enron, 
went out of business even before a single lawsuit was filed against it. In order to avoid this risk of 
litigation, auditors prefer financial statements that are stated and audited strictly according to accounting 
regulations. Because of the vague and contradicting regulations on IC, it could be argued that auditors 
omit IC-related items out of the financial statements. Therefore, auditor conservatism can be considered 
to have a prominent influence on the disclosure of IC-related information. Clarskon et al. (2003) found 
that international accounting firms in particular show conservative auditor behavior.  Consequently, the 
dummy variable “Big4Auditor” was added to the model.  
 
Ownership retention during the IPO could be seen as an indication of the quality of the firm. Since it is 
costly to retain a significant stake in the firm, a large fractional ownership would preclude the 
entrepreneur from diversifying his personal investment. Leland and Pyle (1977) constructed a model to 
predict the behavior of the owner of a company when information asymmetry exists. The model implies 
that the ownership retention will be high if the owners expect that the firm value is higher than reflected in 
the financial statements. Consequently, rational investors will perceive ownership retention as a signal of 
firm value. Furthermore, according to O‟Sullivan (2000), we can expect less disclosure from the company 
if the degree of ownership retention is high. If the directors do not own a substantial portion of the 
company, it can be expected that they encourage more intensive disclosure in order to fulfill their 
monitoring role. Therefore, the variable “Ownership” was added to the model. 
3.3 Model 
In this section the defined hypotheses will be tested by means of a linear regression. The independent 
variable industry will be entered in the equation as several dummy variables. In order to avoid the dummy 
variable trap, one of the industries, namely “IT” was not included in the regression. Admission of this 
industry would lead to multicollinearity since there is a linear relationship between the industry-variables 
(Baker, 2006) 
Score_ARj = λ0 + λ1 Score_IPOj + λ2 Crisisj + λ3 Sizej + λ4 Chemicalsj + λ5  Cons_Goodsj + λ6   
IndGoods_Utulitiesj + λ7 Financial_servicesj  + λ8  Agej + λ9 Auditor + λ10 Ownership  + µj 
where: 
Score_ARj = the result on the index for the subsequent annual report after initial public offering   
Score_IPOj = the result on the index for the prospectus on the year of initial public offering  
Crisisj = a dummy variable equal to 0 for an initial public offering in 2005, 2006 or 2007 and 1 
otherwise 
Sizej = the total assets of the company  
Chemicalsj = a dummy variable equal to 1 if firmj belongs to that industry and 0 otherwise with IT 
as a reference category 
Cons_Goodsj = a dummy variable equal to 1 if firmj belongs to that industry and 0 otherwise with 
IT as a reference category 
IndGoods_Utulitiesj = a dummy variable equal to 1 if firmj belongs to that industry and 0 otherwise 
with IT as a reference category 
Financial_servicesj = a dummy variable equal to 1 if firmj belongs to that industry and 0 otherwise 
with IT as a reference category 
Agej = the difference between 2010 and the year of establishment of firmj 
Auditorj = a dummy variable equal to 1 if firmj is audited by a big 4 company and 0 otherwhise 
Ownershipj = the amount of shares retained by the owners during the IPO, expressed in percent 
 
4. Research findings 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 gives an overview of the different industries and the areas of IC disclosure. A percentage of 33% 
in the area costumers (CU) indicates that 33% of the companies in the chemical industry report on at 
least one item in the area customers. When taking a closer look at the areas of disclosure, most 
companies report on human resources (HR) and strategy (ST). Regarding HR, this can be explained by 
the obligation of companies to deposit a social balance at the national bank of Belgium. This obligation 
also has an impact on the nature of the information reported on. Furthermore, only 36 % of the 
companies in the IT industry disclose information related to IT. Noticeable is that, compared to the annual 
report, companies tend to report in their prospectus on at least one item of the different areas. 
Furthermore, almost each industry reports about its strategy in its prospectus. Moreover, it could be noted 
that for each disclosure area there is a possible relationship between the annual report and the 
prospectus. Areas on which companies disclose much (e.g. HR and ST) are the same for the annual 





4.2 Hypotheses testing 
Table 3 presents the paired sample t-test for hypothesis 1 that states that a more than average level of IC 
disclosure in the prospectus results in a more than average level of IC disclosure in the subsequent 
annual report due to disclosure commitment. As hypothesized, the score for the prospectus is positive 
and significant at the 0.05 level. Company size also significantly influences the results. Since the limited 
amount of observations, the disconfirmation of auditor and age should be taken as a tentative conclusion. 
Industry affiliation is found to have a significant influence to the extent of IC disclosure. 
   
 
 
In order to find evidence for the second hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA was used (table 4). First, we look 
at the impact of the financial crisis on the difference in IC reporting in the prospectus. Companies were 
divided into two groups based on the year IPO (before or after 2008). The descriptive statistics indicate 
that the standard deviations of the observations in each group of similar magnitude. This also follows from 
the Levene‟s test of homogeneity of variances. Hence, the condition of equality of variance is satisfied. 
Hypothesis 2(a) is accepted whereas hypothesis 2(b) is not statistically significant at the 0.05 significance 
level. 
 
Table 5 presents the paired sample t-test for hypothesis 3 that confirms that there exists a relationship 
between the amount of IC disclosure that a company reports in its prospectus and its annual report 




The objective of this study is dual. On the one hand we want to determine the relationship between IC 
disclosure in the prospectus and the annual report and on the other hand we want to investigate the 
impact of the recent economic disturbance on the level of IC disclosure in the prospectus as well as the 
annual report. Each corporate document was manually scanned for IC information based on the index 
developed by Bukh et al (2004). The first hypothesis which states that a more than average level of IC 
disclosure in the prospectus results in a more than average level of IC disclosure in the subsequent 
annual report due to disclosure commitment.confirmed is confirmed. In the next research question we 
determined the impact of the recent economic disturbance on the level of IC disclosure in both prospectus 
and annual report. Only the prospectus was found to be influenced by the financial crisis. Lastly, we 
looked at the impact of the IC disclosure in the prospectus on the level of IC disclosure in the annual 
report. This impact is significant. 
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